AFTER more than a year, the conviction of Faiz Hameed was announced last week. It’s hard to say if it came as a surprise to anyone; after all, once the news of his arrest was made public last year, the conviction was a verdict foretold. And in the last couple of months, there had been quite a few leaks about what was apparently due any day. For someone uninformed and with little access to power, it is hard to say what exactly this conviction means for Pakistan, its state structure and the military. Hence, here are some thoughts and questions on this conviction which undoubtedly is unprecedented, for no officer who headed the ISI has ever been held to account by its own institution. However, it is noteworthy that in Pakistan, with its complex civil-military relations, ISI chiefs have always attracted controversy, more a function of the political and power relations rather than individuals. From Asad Durrani to Hamid Gul and Ehsan ul Haq, who too were rarely ever far from media, which in their day was rather staid and limited. In recent times, we had Shuja Pasha, who perhaps set the trend for extensions, along with his boss. In addition, he was front and centre of crises such as Memogate , where his affidavit became a source of controversy and instability. Though of course, now he is more remembered for his role in propping up the PTI and being the brains behind the famous Lahore jalsa. It is hard to say what exactly Faiz Hameed’s conviction means for Pakistan. He was followed by Zaheer ul Islam who was then accused of having orchestrated the 2014 dharna, at the height of which there were media reports about the unease between him and the then army chief during meetings with the government. Then came Rizwan Akhtar who spent his tenure quietly, as his subordinate Faiz Hameed dominated the spotlight and went up and down the country, managing all that had to be managed, in the run-up to the 2018 election. But even Akhtar was implicated in the controversies that came close to Gen Raheel Sharif’s retirement; for instance, when a senator gave a statement about Qamar Bajwa, who had not yet been chosen to be chief. Hameed, one should acknowledge, had two stints of ‘fame’ during his time in service. From intervention in politics, to allegations of murder to threats, the suppression of the media, and even bribery, he is accused of it all during his time and much of this is now being said publicly. Politicians have spoken about threats he made and what he did, as have journalists. Much detail has been made part of the discourse and is being openly discussed. However, it has to be said that since his departure, Nadeem Anjum also did not stay far away from the public eye or gossip. Indeed, he might have been the only spy head to even do a press conference that was telecast live. Against this backdrop, it is worth wondering if Hameed crossed lines in a way that is unacceptable. This is not to say that he didn’t but it might take some time before it can be concluded if he was an exception or if he ended up creating a new normal in terms of the manner in which he exercised power. Part of the reason this question is hard to answer is because so few details have been released about his conviction. The press release makes it clear that he was accused of misusing his powers; causing loss to people; violating the Official Secrets Act and meddling in politics. One can assume or guess the first two allegations were linked to Top City scandal where he is said to have used defence personnel to threaten and intimidate the owners of the housing society. But the second two are hard to even make educated guesses about. Which of his various alleged acts in the realm of politics have been deemed wrong and which continue to remain kosher remains unclear, especially as the press release hinted that the May 9 investigations may still be pending. Publicly, there is great discussion of what he did but there is no official clarity on what was found actionable during the court martial. And while this discussion may paint him as a villain, whether his conviction will prove to be a deterrent for those who may enjoy similar powers is hard to predict. Third is the May 9 case, which one assumes is what he might face further investigations in, with implications for Imran Khan. The government’s hints and threats about it will continue but even if there is another court martial and then Khan’s conviction, this will not put to rest the debate regarding May 9. Unless the trials are made public. For it will not explain why a senior military officer in Lahore was removed (without any court martial) shortly after May 9 if the real culprits behind the event were Hameed, who was court martialled, and Khan (who, according to speculation, may also be court martialled). And neither will it explain why others accused in May 9 were convicted in ordinary courts on the testimonies of ordinary policemen if the real evidence was solid enough to convict a former DG of ISI and a former PM. Last, there are far too many assertions in the world of commentary of how this punishment of 14 years might be reduced later on. Is this simply conjecture or based on something more substantial? It is hard to say. But some of those who do say this, point to the conviction of Gen Javed Iqbal, which was reduced before he was pardoned. And Iqbal was accused of espionage, which, one assumed is a serious offence, compared to meddling in politics. Indeed, it is hard to conclude so far, if one is a bit sceptical, what kind of turning point Hameed’s conviction is and the break that it will be from past precedents of the institution. The writer is a journalist. Published in Dawn, December 16th, 2025