In public service, the agency problem arises when those entrusted to act on behalf of citizens, “the agents,” pursue interests misaligned with those of the public, i.e., “the principals.” In politically divided societies, this problem intensifies. Contemporary Korea, marked by sharp ideological polarization, generational cleavages, and high-stakes electoral competition, offers a vivid illustration of how agency issues distort governance, erode trust, and yet, paradoxically, create the conditions for institutional renewal. At its core, Korea’s agency challenge is not a lack of talent or administrative capacity. The country’s civil service remains among the most capable in the world, forged through meritocratic exams and reinforced by a strong development-state legacy. Rather, the problem lies in incentive misalignment. Elected officials, senior bureaucrats, and quasi-public institutions increasingly respond to partisan signals, career survival, or media cycles rather than long-term public value. When political power oscillates sharply between camps, agents rationally hedge: th