THE 19th century witnessed a major refinement of policing philosophy. Sir Robert Peel, widely regarded as the father of modern policing, articulated principles that continue to guide democratic police forces. His assertion that “the police are the public, and the public are the police” underlined the idea that police legitimacy flows from public consent rather than coercion. Accountability, restraint, proportionality, and strict adherence to the rule of law were the essential safeguards against the misuse of police power. The evolution of policing thus mirrored the development of the state itself, from coercive authority to regulated power, from force to legitimacy, and from unquestioned command to accountability. While this modern policing model was taking shape in England, the British introduced policing institutions in their newly conquered Indian colony, beginning with Calcutta and Bombay. The uprising of 1857, however, fundamentally altered British priorities. A centralised, Irish-style constabulary was established with the primary objective of control and maintaining order, largely indifferent to public rights. Despite this, the organisational structure itself was built on principles of command and control. Independent Pakistan inherited the colonial police architecture, an efficient law-enforcement machinery designed to control the population rather than to serve it. Tragically, successive political and later military rulers largely assumed the role of colonial masters and failed to undertake meaningful police reform. Despite repeated proclamations of intent, numerous committees and commissions, numbering nearly 30, produced reports that were ultimately unceremoniously consigned to archives. It was only in 2002 that a military ruler, during an initial phase of reformist enthusiasm, enacted a law intended to transform the police from an instrument of enforcement into a service-oriented institution. During the drafting of this law, it was recognised that police strength had expanded in an ad hoc manner to cope with rapid population growth and unplanned urbanisation. The result was an unwieldy colonial police force with vast powers that was becoming increasingly difficult to manage and hold accountable. Multiple police forces need to be established within each province under the existing legal framework. The framers of the law correctly recognised the need for creating additional police forces to ensure effective law enforcement. Political considerations, however, prevented this structural reform. Instead, the proposed law attempted to compensate by introducing concepts of enhanced operational autonomy to the regional commanders and heads of police in the provincial capital cities and large urban police forces. Regrettably, under sustained pressure from political elites, the same military ruler was compelled to dilute this progressive legislation. Core principles of depoliticisation, accountability, and civilian oversight were systematically weakened, restoring, and in some cases deepening, political interference in policing. To address the growing demands of policing an expanding population and chaotic urbanisation, governments resorted to expedient but flawed solutions. Numerous so-called ‘specialised’ units were created outside the formal police structure, complete with standalone police stations and ambiguous lines of accountability. These units were showcased as panaceas for law-and-order problems, but in reality, they generated overlapping mandates. The result was the weakening of a disciplined, uniformed force trained to operate within defined jurisdictions and legal limits, thereby undermining the entire criminal justice system. Specialised units should remain the exception rather than the norm. Their creation must be based strictly on professional needs assessments, embedded within the existing command and control structure. Such units must operate under rigorous oversight and explicit safeguards for fundamental rights. Experience shows that ‘specialised units,’ when allowed to function outside established frameworks, often pursue narrowly defined objectives at the expense of the rule of law. Their prolonged existence fosters impunity, encourages lawlessness and violence, and risks dehumanising their members and turning them into ‘rogue cops.’ For meaningful, sustainable structural police reform, there is a compelling case for smaller and more manageable police jurisdictions. Today, Punjab has a police force of approximately 224,000 personnel, Sindh 160,000, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 125,000, and Balochistan 48,000. It is against all principles of efficient management for armed police forces of this size to be placed under single provincial commanders. Attempts within the existing hierarchy to create empowered urban and regional commands failed because the Police Order 2002 was never implemented in its true spirit and was subsequently rendered ineffective through amendments negating accountability, oversight, autonomy and service. In these circumstances, there is no viable alternative but to establish multiple police forces within each province under the existing legal framework, with no single force exceeding 50,000 personnel. The Central Police Office should be reconstituted as a Provincial Police Directorate, headed by a director general drawn from the senior police leadership. The directorate would be responsible for province-wide coordination, training, standardisation of equipment and transport, and the formulation of uniform operational procedures, supported by a robust system of monitoring and evaluation. Commanders of the newly constituted police forces must be granted guaranteed tenures, enabling them to exercise lawful authority, resist illegal external interference, and provide professional, field-oriented leadership. This framework would enhance efficiency, transparency, and operational effectiveness, while progressively reducing reliance on paramilitary forces for routine policing and emergency response. At the same time, these police forces would remain subject to strong civilian oversight and continuous professional supervision through the Provincial Police Directorate. This reorganisation is achievable within the existing provincial governance framework, without engaging in the politically sensitive issue of creating new provinces. It must, however, be acknowledged as an interim arrangement. Durable and optimal governance can ultimately be achieved only through smaller, empowered, and autonomous provinces. The sooner this reality is confronted, the better for democratic governance and effective policing. The writer is a former IGP Sindh. Published in Dawn, December 27th, 2025