THERE is increasing public questioning and expression of doubts about the wisdom of Pakistan sending troops to join the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) under President Donald Trump’s Gaza peace plan. This is envisaged by the US as a multinational force led by an American general. It is a crucial component of the Trump plan. But its acceptance by Hamas is essential as without that, countries who join it can be drawn into a conflict with the Palestinian group. The government has stated and conveyed to the US administration that it is considering joining the force but a final decision is yet to be made. Last month Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar declared Pakistan was “definitely ready” to contribute to ISF but disarming Hamas was not “our job”. He also said “the Prime Minister has already announced after consultation with the Field Marshal that we will contribute”, but a firm decision will be made once it is clear what ISF’s mandate and terms of reference are. Pakistan has been in discussions with the US over the past several months seeking clarity over the mandate and structure of the Gaza force and related issues. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed this at his recent presser when he conveyed gratitude to Pakistan for the offer to be part of it. But he acknowledged that issues relating to the force’s mandate, command structure and funding were still under discussion. In fact, several other Muslim states who earlier showed interest in joining ISF have since demurred. No country has committed soldiers as they await clarity on key issues. On Dec 16, US Central Command hosted a conference in Doha, in which Pakistan also participated, to discuss the next phases of Trump’s plan including deployment of ISF and to evolve a consensus on its mandate. The meeting failed to reach agreement on the mandate. This means reservations of Muslim countries about the mission persist and they may not participate if the mandate involves forcible disarmament of Hamas and other Palestinian resistance groups. Sending troops to an ill-defined ISF unacceptable to one of the parties is high-risk. To consider whether Pakistan should be part of ISF it is important to first examine the current state of play in Gaza and how the Trump plan’s second phase is unfolding. The next stage is faced with formidable obstacles which have held up the plan, prompting the widening view that the process has stalled because of disagreements between the parties. The Economist described the peace plan as “faltering in the chaos of Gaza”. The gap between the principal parties, Israel and Hamas, remains wide but there are also friction points between the US and Israel. To iron out differences President Trump has invited Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Mar-a-Lago, his Florida home, on Dec 29. The outcome of that meeting will be consequential to the fate of the peace process. The second phase involves establishing governance arrangements for Gaza, further withdrawal of Israeli forces, disarmament of Hamas and deployment of ISF. Announcements about the Board of Peace, headed by Trump, as supervisory authority for Gaza’s transitional governance have yet to be made. Nor have members been named to the technocratic committee of Palestinians responsible for Gaza’s day-to-day running. Although Rubio has said this will soon be done, delays on this count reflect both lack of clarity and consensus. In Gaza itself a shaky ceasefire is breached daily by Israel while it builds new settlements amid military actions in the occupied West Bank. Since the ceasefire took effect in October, over 400 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli airstrikes. Israeli firings have increased across the ceasefire ‘Yellow Line’. This reinforces Israel’s longstanding record of not abiding by agreements and being an unreliable ‘partner for peace’. Meanwhile top Israeli officials continue to say Israel will never withdraw fully from Gaza, as envisaged under the peace plan. In that case, Hamas won’t disarm. From what is known so far it is apparent what ISF is and isn’t. It is not a UN, blue-helmet force. It has a vague UN mandate but no UN supervision. It will not be a peacekeeping force as it will have peace enforcement responsibilities, which makes it operationally different. It will have to work closely with Israeli authorities, other than Egypt. Israel has to approve countries that can be part of the force. When the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the Trump plan was adopted last month, Hamas rejected it and declared any international force, if established, “must be deployed only at the borders to separate forces, monitor the ceasefire, and be fully under UN supervision”. Hamas also said assigning the force the task to disarm groups resisting occupation “strips it of its neutrality, and turns it into a party to the conflict in favour of the occupation”. Recently a Hamas official reiterated this position, adding that talks remain stalled with no agreement on ISF’s tasks and role. Finalisation of the mandate and rules of engagement for the Gaza force that addresses Hamas’s objections will be critical. Without buy-in by Hamas, ISF’s deployment will be ineffective. It is against this backdrop that Pakistan has to take a decision about becoming part of ISF. Participation should be ruled out if the mandate is for troops to police Hamas. That will bring them into direct confrontation with Hamas/other resistance groups and any claim that Pakistani troops are there to protect Palestinians will not wash. The consequences of Pakistani soldiers clashing with Palestinians, regardless of their affiliations, would be dire both on grounds of principle and the public backlash at home. Deployment would involve close cooperation with Israel, who is entirely untrustworthy and routinely fires at UN peacekeepers in Lebanon. What happens if Israeli forces start firing at ISF’s Pakistani contingent? Moreover, cooperation with Israel will be tantamount to implicit recognition of Israel and only a step away from formal recognition and joining the Abraham Accords. All this without any movement towards establishment of a Palestinian state. This will be contrary to Pakistan’s long-standing policy. Finally, Pakistan must consider that given obvious hurdles in enforcing an ill-defined Gaza peace plan and chances of it becoming a messy, inconclusive affair, should it risk walking into a quagmire which puts our soldiers in harm’s way. Pakistan’s national interests should be supreme in a decision that must be made in full transparency. The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN. Published in Dawn, December 29th, 2025