Korean democracy is not collapsing. It is entering a more subtle, precarious phase in which the erosion of principle is no longer clearly recognized as a problem. As 2026 begins, Korea still presents itself, at least formally, as a functioning democratic state. More than six months have passed since the current administration took office, and governance has moved well beyond its initial stage. The National Assembly legislates, courts issue rulings and the executive operates without visible disruption. There is no formal institutional vacuum and no obvious breakdown of constitutional machinery. However, a persistent sense of unease and fatigue continues to grow across Korean society. This unease cannot be explained away simply by early policy failures or by the confusion that often follows a change of government. Nor can it be dismissed as a mere aftershock of electoral polarization. It has emerged more gradually through the manner in which the current government exercises state power in a way that increasingly suggests a diminished commitment to being constrained, justified and discip