PAKISTAN’S power circles are jubilant over their successes in 2025, which stemmed from multiple factors, the most significant being the restoration of trust with the US. Whatever factors compelled the Trump administration to enhance engagement with Pakistan, this shift has altered Pakistan’s regional position primarily in South and West Asia, and partially in Central Asia. The change in the US attitude towards Pakistan began early this year, even before the May stand-off with India, when American President Donald Trump and Centcom chief Michael Kurilla praised Pakistan’s contribution to the war against terrorism and thanked the country for handing over the mastermind of the Abbey Gate terrorist attack by IS-K to the US. Here lies Pakistan’s real strength: while engaged in a prolonged war against terrorism and dealing with multiple strands of terrorist groups, including the Taliban, who now rule Afghanistan, the country has gained experience in managing global threats and winning the trust of international partners. Action against IS-K opened several doors for Pakistan in regional and defence cooperation with many Muslim countries, including the much-discussed Pak-Saudi defence pact. It remains to be seen how far these engagements will go and whether Pakistan can translate them into tangible economic and political gains. In the absence of authentic official data, research groups rely heavily on open sources. However, the internal security front has become more critical, as religiously motivated terrorist groups and Baloch sub-national militant organisations continue to thrive, complicating the country’s security challenges. State institutions responsible for addressing internal security challenges and terrorism threats have failed to provide authentic statistics on terrorist activities and the state’s response to them. The official body tasked with this responsibility, the National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta), offers little substance on its website beyond a list of proscribed organisations; the rest consists of claims without supporting evidence. At times, provincial law-enforcement agencies issue figures, but these efforts are inconsistent and lack detail. ISPR frequently conducts media briefings and presents statistics, but beyond numbers, substantive details of counterterrorism operations are rarely provided. Law-enforcement agencies cite various justifications, often claiming that while they compile data, they do not make it public because it may be legally contested. Such claims will be questioned unless tested. Meanwhile, several private research organisations perform this function by publishing periodic and annual reports on terrorism trends in the country. These research groups face their own constraints. In the absence of an authentic official database, they rely heavily on open sources. Such information typically comes from ISPR press releases and, in some cases, provincial law-enforcement agencies. Another source is the monthly and annual statistics issued by terrorist organisations themselves. These groups exaggerate their operations, but without an official database, it becomes difficult to fully refute their claims. Organisations compiling terrorism-related data in Pakistan generally follow two approaches: some rely exclusively on officially confirmed media reports, while others cross-check with data released by terrorist organisations. Verification on the ground has become nearly impossible, as local media in conflict zones often cannot report incidents, and even when reports reach newsrooms, editors tend to prioritise official press releases. The purpose of outlining the background of terrorism-related data compilation is twofold: first, to show that Pakistan has faced severe terrorism for decades yet still lacks an authentic database; and second, to highlight that data compiled by various organisations shows fluctuations. Nevertheless, a review of reports released this year reveals a serious trend: the terrorist threat is worsening, not only in operational terms but also in terms of ideological, political and tactical realignments. For instance, an annual security report issued by the Pak Institute for Studies and Peace Studies, which has been conducting this assessment since 2005, reported a sharp surge in militant violence in 2025. A total of 699 terrorist attacks were recorded nationwide, an increase of 34 per cent compared to the previous year. This renewed wave of violence claimed at least 1,034 lives, marking a 21pc rise in terrorism-related fatalities. In addition, 1,366 people were injured during the year, underscoring the growing human cost of terrorism. The report notes that security and law-enforcement personnel bore the brunt of the violence. Of the total fatalities recorded, 437, or more than 42pc, were personnel from security and law-enforcement agencies, including 174 policemen, 122 soldiers, 107 FC members (Frontier Corps and Federal Constabulary), 21 Levies personnel, 12 paramilitary troops, and one Rangers official. Civilians were also heavily affected, with 354 non-combatants killed. Meanwhile, 243 militants died either in suicide attacks or during retaliatory fire by security forces. Balochistan and KP’s tribal districts remain the most critical regions. These developments triggered coercive responses by security forces against terrorist hideouts across the border and led to heightened tensions with Afghanistan, which Pakistan accuses of hosting and supporting terrorist groups, including TTP and the Balochistan Liberation Army. The success graph of Pakistan’s security forces also remained high last year, with 2025 recording the highest number of terrorists killed in a single year. Nonetheless, Pakistan seeks international acknowledgment of these successes. However, the rising number of terrorist attacks indicates that while the kinetic approach is yielding results, the non-kinetic approach is not adequately complementing military operations. A weak non-kinetic framework is evident in the state’s inability to develop a verifiable terrorism database, even as state institutions expect Pakistan not to be ranked highly in global terrorism databases. Nacta and law-enforcement agencies in Pakistan hardly grasp that the most reputable global organisations require verifiable data, yet Pakistan’s LEAs insist that the world should simply believe their claims. Despite this, Pakistan faced difficulties with the FATF due to the submission of non-verifiable data, and it remained on the grey list until the country presented improved statistics. The writer is a security analyst. Published in Dawn, January 4th, 2026