Yemen war: Is a new order emerging in the Red Sea? Submitted by Taqadum al-Khatib on Tue, 01/06/2026 - 20:49 Amid an unprecedented spat between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, regional states are reassessing their strategies and alliances A Saudi coalition air strike hits Southern Transitional Council forces in Yemen’s Hadhramaut governorate on 2 January 2026 (Aden Independent Channel/AFP) On The recent military strike by Saudi Arabia against UAE -backed forces in Yemen was not a fleeting tactical incident. It marked a pivotal moment, signalling that the region has entered a new phase - one characterised by the collapse of the very idea of alliances. The Saudi strike in Mukalla represented the breakdown of a structure built since 2011 on the illusion that chaos can be harnessed without repercussions for those who create it. The attack stemmed from a harsh realisation: keeping Yemen weak produces armed entities that threaten to turn Saudi Arabia’s southern border into a permanent vulnerability, much like southern Lebanon vis-a-vis Israel , or northern Syria with regards to Turkey . This was not a show of force, but a strike driven by fears that previously reliable instruments of influence could transform into sources of future threat. The message to the UAE was not only military, but structural. The era of playing on the margins, building influence through local proxies and cross-border militias, has become costly and potentially self-defeating. For the UAE, the strike exposed a severe strategic vulnerability. Abu Dhabi has not built its power on demographic depth or historical-political weight, nor does it possess symbolic capital, as seen in other regional cities like Mecca, Medina, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad and Istanbul. This structural void makes it difficult for Abu Dhabi to establish enduring imperial influence in the region, regardless of its wealth or financial capabilities. Instead, it relies on a model of indirect control through ports, islands, maritime routes and private security firms. This model worked during the period of regional Arab collapse - but it becomes fragile when states, even exhausted ones, begin reclaiming the instinct for survival and defence of their vital spaces. Out of the shadows The pressing question for the UAE is not merely how to respond to this strike, but whether it can continue operating as a shadow player in an era that no longer tolerates shadows - or whether the current logic will push it into becoming a direct actor in conflicts that exceed its demographic and political capacity. This brings us to the Red Sea, which is no longer merely a maritime corridor, but an open arena for power redistribution. Israel is not seeking to control it through occupation, but to strip it of any effective Arab sovereignty: a “sea of indecision”, secured through indirect bases, fragile entities, and security agreements with states seeking protection rather than agency. At the same time, Iran does not desire a stable Red Sea; it wants it volatile, a global leverage tool. Turkey, for its part, does not contest the core directly, but surrounds the peripheries - Libya , the Horn of Africa, Qatar - to enable broader negotiations. Every major power extends its hand to the water, while Arab states quarrel on the shores. In this phase of regional history, it is not those who miscalculate who are punished, but those who leave space unguarded In this context, Israel’s recent recognition of Somaliland was not a symbolic or diplomatic gesture, but rather an advanced move aimed at reshaping the Red Sea. Whoever establishes a foothold in the Horn of Africa monitors the Bab al-Mandeb Strait - and whoever controls that vital waterway can choke or protect the Gulf, and pressure or neutralise Egypt . Modern wars are not waged with tanks, but with recognition, logistics, and networks of influence operating under the guise of investment or counterterrorism. This broader context cannot be understood outside of Israel’s overarching strategy, which does not aim to topple Arab states wholesale, but to dismantle their sovereign capacities and transform them into functional units or perpetual crisis zones. Palestine was the first model: two territories without sovereignty. This was followed by Lebanon through central state paralysis, Syria via influence maps, Iraq by maintaining structural divisions without formal disintegration, and Sudan through fragmenting the state. Algeria is a different but concerning case in Israel’s estimation: a state with liberation memories, an ideologically disciplined army, and a firm stance on normalisation , making it a target for weakening rather than dismantling, through regional exhaustion across the Sahel, Libya, Morocco and the Western Sahara, alongside strategic isolation from the Mashreq. Normalisation has become a central tool in this architecture, incorporating certain Arab states into an Israeli-led security system, and distributing roles as funders, intermediaries or corridor guards. Here, the “functional state” emerges as the ideal model: a state without sovereign ambitions - one whose influence rests on ports, bases and security companies, rather than on political decision-making or popular depth. Fragmenting states This explains Israel’s focus on areas of the Gulf and Horn of Africa. It targets entities within states to fragment them into functional units within its network of influence, including southern Yemen via the Southern Transitional Council , tribal areas in Algeria , Libyan territories under renegade general Khalifa Haftar , and parts of Somalia. Using normalisation and international recognition, Israel aims to transform these entities into leverage tools, while other major states retain limited decision-making powers. The UAE thus becomes a functional entity linking these regions to Israeli alliances, and ensuring control over vital corridors, while traditional Arab powers - such as Egypt, Algeria and Syria - face mounting pressure to adjust their policies or accept the regional rules of the game. Going forward, potential scenarios include continued military escalation in Yemen, potentially evolving into a regional confrontation that again threatens Red Sea shipping and compels Egypt to become more engaged in protecting strategic corridors and the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, Israel may move to consolidate its position in Somalia and the Horn of Africa to ensure control over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and to link the Red Sea to Gulf alliances, placing the region under near-total Israeli oversight while limiting Arab autonomy. Why Yemen is a key tool in UAE-Israeli plot for regional chaos Read More » At the same time, Iran will continue leveraging the Houthis and the Horn of Africa as pressure tools against the Gulf and Egypt, reshaping naval balances and forcing Arab states to reorganise alliances and negotiate comprehensive regional security arrangements. Turkey may also enter this arena directly through partnerships with Sudan or Somalia, increasing the strategic complexity. For Egypt, the central challenges include its concession on the Tiran and Sanafir islands , a divided Sudan, and a weakened Libya. These factors limit its ability to secure vital corridors, compelling it to develop new alliances or bolster the international security presence to maintain Red Sea stability. Egypt today occupies the most precarious regional position, because it is the most constrained. Relinquishing Tiran and Sanafir did not just mark the loss of two islands; it was the loss of a symbol of control over the northern gateway to the Red Sea. At the same time, allowing Sudan to fracture depleted its strategic depth, and managing Libya security-wise without a long-term political project left it open to external interventions. The result is that Egypt faces the erosion of its deterrence capacity, alongside an existential question: does it wish to reclaim genuine blocking power, or remain managed as a “stable space” within a turbulent region? What is happening today is not a transient crisis, but a clear epochal shift: from a Middle East where crises were managed, to one where its maps are managed. The struggle is not only between states, but over a vacuum of sovereignty, decision-making and deterrence. In this phase of regional history, it is not those who miscalculate who are punished, but those who leave space unguarded. Those who fail to fill the vacuum themselves will see it filled by others. This is the harsh law now governing the region. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye. Yemen War Opinion Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:29 Update Date Override 0