IRAN’S clerical regime seems to have weathered yet another wave of internal resistance, exploited, as always, by its external rivals. But the human losses have left a deep new wound on the Iranian psyche. The immediate threat of a US-Israeli strike has also dispersed . Washington and Tel Aviv, backed by most Gulf capitals, recalibrated their stance after strategic assessments highlighted the danger of a wider regional war and the absence of any realistic plan for a post-regime change scenario. Inside Iran, resistance against the establishment still struggles to form a unified front or leadership. However, this does not mean the US, Israel or their allies have dropped the goal of political change in Tehran. Instead, they are adjusting their methods. Media reports indicate the regime will not collapse quickly due to a strong security apparatus, loyal institutions, and backing from a sizable segment of the population. Even so, external actors, along with internal resistance networks, are unlikely to allow the regime much time to fully recover from this crisis. Pressure is expected to persist, shifting from low to high intensity, to gradually soften the ground for change. A key indicator that the ground is fertile for such a shift are the visible cracks within the Assembly of Experts (Majles-i-Khobregan-i-Rahbari), the Guardian Council (Shura-i-Negahban), and disputes within or between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the regular military (Artesh). All these critical institutions are still aligned with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s core strategic worldview, as one Iranian-origin expert noted. The recent internal resistance has emboldened separatist elements in Arab and Kurdish regions. To break the regime’s coherence, external actors would not only seek to energise internal political resistance but also exploit other domestic fault lines, including fuelling dormant or active insurgencies. Analysts speculate that separatist and anti-clerical movements are concentrated in several key regions: Khuzestan province in the southwest, where many Arab Iranians harbour grievances; the western border areas, including Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan, where Kurdish separatists remain active; and, from a Pakistani perspective, the Baloch districts in Sistan-Baluchestan and parts of the Khorasan region, where anti-regime Baloch insurgent groups continue their operations. As Vali Nasr explains in his latest book, Iran’s Grand Strategy, the clerical regime’s doctrine of ‘forward defence’, projecting power abroad to protect the state at home, can also be turned against Iran. Its adversaries can adopt the same approach to weaken the regime from within. Iran’s enemies have already disrupted the Axis of Resistance, the network of Iranian regional proxies built around this forward defence strategy. The next step, as a few analysts suggest, could be the deployment or activation of proxies inside Iran itself. If this occurs, the primary objective would be to draw the Iranian Revolutionary Guard into a deeper engagement on the internal front. An amalgam of political resistance and armed struggle can strain Iranian forces, especially when their proxies cannot come to their aid, as Iran’s Axis of Resistance is weak and unable to provide any support. These broader trends are now evident on the ground. Although reports suggest that the recent internal resistance has emboldened separatist elements in Arab and Kurdish regions, it is in the Sistan-Balochestan belt where several militant outfits have reportedly formed a stronger coalition to intensify their campaign against the Iranian state. Jaishul Adl is a Baloch separatist group operating along the Iran-Pakistan border. It frequently targets Iranian security forces in Baloch-majority regions. The group now calls itself the People’s Fighters Front (PFF). Three smaller militant outfits, the Nasr Movement, the Pada Baloch Movement, and the Muhammad Rasul Allah Group, have reportedly merged into this new organisation. This rebranding is significant. By shedding its overtly religious identity, Jaishul Adl is attempting to project a more accommodative, secular nationalist profile that resonates better with the region’s relatively moderate Baloch population. It also aligns the group’s ideology with that of other nationalist insurgent movements, such as the terrorist Baloch organisations BLF and BLA and Kurdish groups like PJAK. Such a shift is also likely to make the organisation more eligible for support and funding from the Baloch and Iranian diaspora, as well as other external backers. Strategically, the makeover aims to make the group acceptable to the West and the Arab world. It mirrors Abdolmalik Rigi’s approach. He was the founder of a Baloch militant group in Iran and sought Western backing but failed, as the global war on terrorism was at its peak then. This is a different time. If separatist groups inside Iran become more active, they might join forces with Baloch separatists in Pakistan, who have sharpened their skills. Some experts are unsure about this, arguing that the PFF has long been seen as Saudi-backed. Since Riyadh maintains strong ties with Pakistan, the alliance seems unlikely. But if the PFF has gained support from other external players, it could act with more strategic independence. Baloch separatist groups on both sides of the border ultimately subscribe to the idea of a ‘Greater Balochistan’. This concept spans regions of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, making cross-border cooperation a possibility. If turmoil grows in Sistan-Baluchestan, many terrorist actors could get involved. These could include IS elements and militants who have left Ahmed al-Sharaa’s networks in Syria. As this region is part of the Golden Crescent, a hub for drug trafficking and human smuggling, the ongoing instability could create a chaotic zone across Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Any significant political shift in Iran will inevitably affect Pakistan with its broad geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences. While certain outcomes may offer limited strategic advantages for Pakistan, escalating instability along the Iran-Pakistan border would raise internal security pressures and could generate serious frictions with the regime in Tehran. The writer is a security analyst Published in Dawn, January 18th, 2026