ISLAMABAD: The Federal Constitutional Court observed that the wording of Section 175 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is clear and straightforward, and that the provision can be invoked for the enforcement of any part of the Ordinance. A three-judge bench of the FCC, headed by Justice Aamer Farooq and comprising Justice Ali Baqar Najafi and Justice Rozi Khan Barrech, upheld the Sindh High Court (SHC) judgment, stating, “The impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference.” Counsel for the petitioner, M/s Sceptre Pvt. Ltd., contended that it is a sine qua non for the applicability of Section 175 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 that there must be some ongoing proceedings against the petitioner. The SHC, in a writ petition challenging the raid conducted by the tax authorities under Section 175 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, held that the action was valid. READ ALSO: Constitutional indictment of tax policy: Parliament abdicates, FBR legislates The judgment said where the language of the legislature is express and unequivocal, the courts are not at liberty to qualify, dilute, or contradict it. It further said that when Parliament has expressly provided in Section 175 that “In order to enforce any provision of the Ordinance, the Commissioner or any officer authorised in writing by the Commissioner for the purposes of this section shall, at all times and without prior notice, have full and free access [including real-time electronic access] to any premises, place, accounts, documents or computer,” how can a court of law read into the statutory provision that a proceeding must be pending before Section 175(1)(a) of the Ordinance can be triggered? The answer is that it cannot. The FCC further said that the Courts must be restrained to grant relief in a manner that runs contrary to clear and express statutory provisions. The Ordinance unequivocally states “in order to enforce any provisions of the Ordinance,” and the term “any” must be understood to encompass the entirety of the Ordinance. It said that in light of judgment in K.K. Oil and Ghee Mills Pvt. v. FBR, 2016 PCTLR 441 what the reading of Section 175 of the Ordinance holistically suggests is that it “empowers” the Commissioner to act for the “enforcement of any provision of this Ordinance”. Now, this power is not unlimited either and nor unfettered as it is “conditional”. The judgment said that the words (in Section 175) used by the Parliamentarians is “enforcement” and “enforcement” requires “breach”. When a law is breached, then it is “enforced”. If the statute had used the word “implement” then it seems that the situation would have been different. Herein, the power is circumscribed by a certain breach of the provisions of the Ordinance, to which the Commissioner or the authorised individual is to then “enforce,” and therefore, “there must be a clear statement before the Commissioner of which provision of the Ordinance is to be enforced and the reasons for it,” because “without such an explicit statement, in writing this power under this Section can be abused”, said the judgment while See, Khurram Shahzad v. Federation of Pakistan, 2019 PTD 1124. The FCC judgment noted that the words used are very clear and simple, that this provision can be invoked for enforcement of any provision of the Ordinance. The impugned judgment correctly rejected the petitioner’s plea on the ground that the Court’s precedent in the Agha Steels case was followed. Even if the requirements laid down in Agha Steel case are not strictly followed, the mere fact remains that the Commissioner or an officer authorized by him is empowered to act for the enforcement of the Ordinance under Section 175. Copyright Business Recorder, 2026