The Manila Times
THE murky world of Automatic Identification System (AIS) manipulation is no longer limited to dredgers in Manila Bay. From cargo ships to tankers, and even state-linked maritime militias, vessels across the globe are exploiting loopholes in the AIS, the international framework for tracking ships and ensuring maritime safety. In the Philippines, these practices are raising red flags for authorities and maritime watchdogs alike. AIS, mandated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), functions as a vessel’s passport, broadcasting its identity, flag and location to authorities and other ships. But as SeaLight director, retired United States Air Force colonel Ray Powell, explained in an exclusive interview, some vessels exploit AIS to operate under multiple identities, masking ownership and activity. “Every ship should have a single, verifiable identity,” Powell said. “What we are seeing now is ships switching flags and identities back and forth, sometimes multiple times a day. It’s like showing up at the airport with multiple passports — legal for individuals only in very limited circumstances, impossible for vessels.” In Manila Bay, two dredgers — Bucao Star and Aurora 168 — illustrate the problem locally. The Bucao Star, first spotted off Bataan in 2022 flying the Sierra Leone flag, shares an IMO number with Guang Zhou Star, a Chinese-built vessel, suggesting the same ship is operating under two identities. Despite flying the Philippine flag in late 2025, it continues to broadcast its Sierra Leone registration on AIS. Similarly, the Kang Ling 539, originally launched in China as He Xing 669, has cycled through over 30 identities, spanning flags from Sierra Leone and Panama to the Philippines. Powell said these overlapping identities allow ships to obscure ownership and regulatory compliance, often through shell companies in the Philippines controlled by foreign entities. “Dredgers may seem benign, but they are just the tip of the iceberg,” Powell said. “If you’re manipulating AIS here, you could be doing the same thing anywhere else.” AIS manipulation is not confined to dredgers. Cargo ships and tankers frequently switch identities to conceal activities such as ship-to-ship oil transfers or cargo routing through restricted regions. Powell cited incidents near Taiwan, where vessels involved in seabed disruptions switched multiple flags and identities to avoid detection. Even state-linked vessels, including maritime militias and Chinese Coast Guard ships, exploit AIS by going “dark” — turning off their broadcasts — or adopting generic or false identification numbers to conceal operations. “Sometimes the AIS number is just 123456 instead of a legitimate registration,” Powell said. “It’s meant to confuse authorities and hide activity.” These manipulations create tactical blind spots for navies and coast guards, complicating real-time responses. In the Philippines, vessels can appear to be local dredgers on AIS screens while actually being foreign-controlled, allowing them to operate outside legitimate areas. Powell cited dredgers venturing to Northern Luzon, far beyond authorized zones, potentially for intelligence gathering, seabed mapping or resource staging. Powell emphasized that technology can help mitigate the threat of AIS manipulation. AI-powered tracking systems now allow authorities to detect suspicious activity in near real-time, rather than waiting for retrospective reports. Private maritime intelligence companies like Windward, aggregate AIS data to identify anomalies, and alert regulators and governments. Yet gaps remain in interagency and international coordination. Powell noted that much of the world’s maritime data sharing remains inefficient, relying on liaison officers and outdated “fusion centers.” Moving toward cloud-based platforms and international cooperation is essential to make AIS anomalies harder to exploit. “Transparency is the first line of defense,” Powell said. “By shining a light on these activities, we make it harder for ships to operate in the shadows. The Philippines is paying attention, but vigilance must be constant. AIS manipulation is not just a local issue — it’s a global challenge with very real local consequences.” On Friday, SeaLight said a Chinese deep-sea research vessel appears to be operating inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) without authorization. Citing maritime tracking data from StarboardIntel, SeaLight said the vessel, Tan Suo Er Hao, left Sanya Port on March 15 and has been conducting survey operations in Philippine waters. Between March 21 and 31, the vessel conducted surveys near Benham Rise, encroaching on the edge of the Philippine EEZ. It later passed through the Luzon Strait and lingered about 50 nautical miles from the Batanes Islands on April 1, also within the EEZ. As of April 3, the Tan Suo Er Hao was positioned at approximately 19.6°N, 119.1°E, or about 100 nautical miles from the nearest Philippine baseline near the Babuyan Islands. Operated by the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Deep-Sea Science and Engineering, the Tan Suo Er Hao serves as a mothership for China’s Fendouzhe and Shenhaiyongshi, both crewed submersibles. The vessel has 13 onboard laboratories and a full-ocean-depth geological winch, giving it significant capability for both scientific research and intelligence collection. Under Article 246 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), marine scientific research in a coastal state’s EEZ requires the coastal state’s “express consent.” The Philippines has not reportedly granted such consent for the vessel’s activities. Maritime analysts say the presence of research vessels like the Tan Suo Er Hao in foreign EEZs can carry both scientific and strategic implications, particularly in contested maritime areas. This is not the first time that a Chinese research vessel was monitored inside the country's EEZ. In May 2025, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) expelled the Tansuo 3 from the waters off Burgos, Ilocos Norte, where it was allegedly conducting illegal deep-sea mapping operations. Tansuo 3—one of China’s largest and most advanced research vessels—was accompanied by the manned submersible Shanghai Yongshi (Deep Sea Warrior), capable of diving up to 4,500 meters. According to Jun Kajee, a Sealight analyst and researcher, China is increasingly using research and survey vessels to assert control over contested waters across the Indo-Pacific. “These missions blur the line between legitimate scientific research and covert intelligence gathering or strategic signaling, allowing China to expand its maritime presence while maintaining plausible deniability,” said Kajee. He emphasized this tactic is central to China’s “gray zone” maritime strategy—a methodical campaign of non‑violent, incremental coercion designed to assert dominance without triggering armed conflict. The approach blends civilian cover, legal ambiguity, and constant presence to shift control in Beijing’s favor. Kajee noted that Chinese survey vessels conduct oceanographic research, resource mapping, and data collection—activities that ostensibly serve civilian purposes but can also bolster military operations. The dual-use capabilities provide valuable intelligence for submarine routing, undersea cable monitoring, and acoustic sensor deployment. He said survey vessels rarely operate alone, and are often escorted by China Coast Guard or maritime militia ships.
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