Dawn.com
A CLEAR victory in war can be difficult to determine, as a conflict’s actual impact unfolds over time through political, economic and strategic outcomes. Human losses, destruction of infrastructure and targeting of military assets are only the visible dimensions of a conflict — the more decisive element rests in dialogue as all wars conclude at the negotiating table. Yet, managing such a table is neither simple nor automatic. It requires credibility, balance and strategic patience, qualities that Pakistan has tried to demonstrate by facilitating engagement between Iran and the US. Pakistan’s facilitation has largely been confined to bringing together the long-time adversaries that were once partners but later confronted each other through multiple conflicts, employing a wide range of tactics and strategies to counter one another. It is uncertain at this point whether these negotiations will herald a new phase in relations between Iran and the US. The prospects of rebuilding the level of trust that existed during the Shah’s era appear limited, especially in view of the hard-line orientation of the current regime in Iran — this war, in fact, might have reinforced Tehran’s sense of strategic pride and made the country more hesitant to move closer to a state it has long defined as an adversary. In fact, this view has shaped much of Iran’s geopolitical and geo-economic outlook. The implications of the war are significant. The regime in Iran has survived, but survival alone should not be mistaken for strength, as the country is now militarily stretched and faces political and economic constraints. In fact, within Iran’s borders, a challenge has surfaced which is perhaps more complex than the one on the external front. The regime’s immediate priority is likely internal consolidation; long-term sustainability will depend on a deeper shift towards accommodation. Many commentators have observed that the more enduring challenge lies in integrating Iran into a rules-based regional order, a task that not only demands changes in Iran’s external conduct but also adjustments in its internal political and ideological orientation. Equally important is the evolving relationship between Muslim-majority states and Israel. This is an unresolved aspect that continues to shape the broader strategic environment. Pakistan now has an opportunity to convert its diplomatic role into lasting gains. Assuming, however, that despite Iran’s current posture an agreement is achieved that triggers a process of normalisation between the US and Iran, the regional implications would be significant — especially for the trajectory of relations between Iran and Pakistan that have been historically strained since the rise of the post-revolutionary Iranian regime. This trajectory would merit close attention. A sustained negotiation process could gradually transform bilateral ties, but the most critical variable lies in the nature of Iran-US relations. If both countries manage to build a minimum level of trust and the US moves towards lifting sanctions, it could fundamentally reshape relations between Pakistan and Iran, creating space to operationalise long-delayed projects such as the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline . Enhanced border trade could transform the economic landscape of the Balochistan border region, while increased cooperation could improve joint efforts against militant networks operating on both sides of the border. If such cooperation evolves, it could also change the regional dynamics and reshape Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan and the Gulf, particularly with Afghanistan, on which Iran and Pakistan shared a common strategic view in the Shah’s era. However, the key question remains: how would Israel respond to such a normalisation process? The conflict appears to have rendered Israel’s global image more complicated, raising questions about its strategic outcomes. America may, in turn, reassess the costs of aligning its broader strategic and geo-economic interests with Israel’s regional posture. Similarly, Arab states are likely to re-evaluate the balance of costs and benefits in their alignment with Washington. In such a scenario, a frustrated Israel could attempt to disrupt or slow down any long-term peace process between the US and Iran. The durability of normalisation, therefore, would depend not only on bilateral commitments but also on how regional actors respond to the shifting strategic landscape. Apart from the optimism resulting from the recent developments, the conflict is still to reach closure, as its impact goes far beyond immediate hostilities and is reshaping a once clearly divided regional map into a more fluid and interconnected geopolitical space that links the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia and the Caucasus. As this new order evolves, middle powers such as Pakistan and Turkiye are emerging as key actors. Islamabad’s mediation in the war has highlighted Pakistan’s role as a bridge state that is capable of navigating competing interests. This shift is reinforced by Pakistan’s ties with the US, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, while Washington moves towards a burden-sharing model that redistributes regional responsibilities. Russia’s ongoing war with Ukraine and its consequent diminished influence has speeded up these realignments. Regardless of the changes, stability in critical chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz remains essential, even as the conflict demonstrates that battlefield gains do not necessarily translate into strategic dominance. Ultimately, the war reinforces the truth that enduring outcomes are shaped by dialogue rather than force. This presents Pakistan with both an opportunity and a test to convert its diplomatic role into lasting strategic and economic gains. Lastly, on an optimistic note, if Iran also becomes a partner of Pakistan and Turkiye in the evolving global order, as envisioned during the Cold War era through initiatives such as the Regional Cooperation for Development, it would represent a significant leap and could reshape Pakistan’s relations with Central Asia as well. Beyond such aspirations, much will depend on the vision of Pakistan’s state institutions, their alignment, and how they prioritise these relationships in the future. The writer is a security analyst. Published in Dawn, April 12th, 2026
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