The Manila Times
MANILA, Philippines — As the government tightened its noose on fugitive Sen. Ronald dela Rosa, members of the Supreme Court, which paved the way for his arrest by the International Criminal Court (ICC) by thumbing down his petition to stop the enforcement of the warrant explain their positions. Voting 9-5-1 during a special en banc session on May 20, 2026, the Court denied dela Rosa’s application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) or status quo ante order that sought to bar government agencies from arresting him on the basis of any ICC warrant, Interpol Red Notice, or foreign judicial process without a Philippine-issued warrant. The full decision, including the concurring and dissenting opinions, was released to the public on Monday. Here are some of the justices' opinions and why: Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa In his concurring opinion, Caguioa said the Court “should not come to the rescue of an individual, a public officer no less, who is charged with mass murder, and who is being brought before the ICC to face the consequences of his actions that flouted the rule of law with impunity.” Caguioa said dela Rosa’s plea for immediate judicial intervention must be viewed in light of the “recent history of impunity” that drove victims of the anti-drug campaign to seek relief before an international tribunal. “To invoke due process in order to prolong historical injustices is a severe insult to the deceased and trivializes the immense agony of the families left behind,” he wrote. On the issue of whether an ICC arrest warrant requires validation by a Philippine court, Caguioa argued that “there is no need for a separate warrant from a Philippine judge in order to effectuate an arrest for cases cognizable by the ICC,” citing Article 59(4) of the Rome Statute. He said probable cause determinations for ICC cases fall exclusively under ICC judges because such offenses were not cognizable before Philippine courts. Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen In a separate concurrence, Leonen emphasized that courts generally did not restrain criminal prosecutions through injunctions or prohibition. He added that legal remedies remained available even after an arrest, and that provisional judicial relief could not be used to preempt law enforcement action at that stage. Associate Justice Maria Filomena Singh Singh, meanwhile, pointed to dela Rosa’s conduct and invoked the equitable doctrine of “clean hands.” Singh noted that the senator allegedly went into hiding for months, resurfaced only to participate in the Senate leadership election, and later disappeared again. “The present record weighs heavily against the grant of provisional relief,” Singh wrote. “Senator dela Rosa’s actions… show that his conduct has been tainted with bad faith.” “This conduct shows that Senator dela Rosa only engaged with the legal processes based on his convenience, and reflects inequitable conduct which should bar the grant of the relief he seeks,” she added. Dissenting justices The five dissenting justices — Ramon Paul Hernando, Amy Lazaro-Javier, Henri Jean Paul Inting, Ricardo Rosario, and Antonio Kho Jr. — argued that dela Rosa satisfied the requirements for injunctive relief and faced the risk of irreversible harm if arrested and transferred to The Hague. Associate Justice Ramon Paul Hernando In his four-page dissent, Hernando said there was “no domestic judicial process authorizing the arrest or surrender” of dela Rosa to the ICC and maintained that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the case. He warned there was “zero guarantee” that dela Rosa would not be immediately surrendered once arrested. “Indeed, the injury cannot be repaired after the fact by any subsequent ruling. Hence, the necessity of an injunctive relief,” Hernando wrote. Hernando also questioned Section 17 of Republic Act 9851, saying cooperation with international tribunals “must still operate within constitutional limits.” “Cooperation with international tribunals must still be exercised in a manner that does not contravene the Bill of Rights and the statutory protections that implement them,” he said. Justice Amy Lazaro-Javier In her nine-page dissent, Javier said the issue required “a disciplined legal inquiry and not a referendum on personality, political identity, or public sentiment.” She argued that the circumstances “not only justify but necessitate the issuance of temporary injunctive relief.” “The rights at stake are neither speculative nor abstract. The potential injury is not merely political or reputational; it is juridical, concrete, and irreparable,” Lazaro-Javier wrote. “To deny provisional relief under these conditions is to expose petitioner to harm that the law itself recognizes as intolerable,” she added.
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